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Abstract 
 
Organizational support theory proposes that 
employees develop global beliefs concerning the degree 
to which an organization values their contributions and 
cares about their well-being. These beliefs, known as 
perceived organizational support (POS), are related to 
a number of positive employee outcomes, including: job 
satisfaction, work effort, performance, etc. Three 
categories of POS antecedents have been recognized in 
the literature: perceived supervisor support; fairness of 
organizational procedures; and organizational rewards 
and job conditions. In this paper, we explore these 
antecedent categories in the gig-work context where 
organizations replace human managers with 
algorithmic management practices and data-driven 
procedures. In doing so, we develop a new conceptual 
model that centers on the role that a gig-organization’s 
algorithm plays in engendering POS by promoting 
perceptions of algorithmic fairness (PAF) and 
perceptions of autonomy support (PAAS). Contributions 
and future research avenues are discussed. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The gig-economy is an emerging labor market in 
which organizations engage independent workers to 
complete short-term contracts known as “gigs”, by 
connecting workers to customers via a platform-enabled 
digital marketplace. Lauded as the future of work [1], 
industry experts predict that by 2023 more than half of 
the U.S. workforce will participate in the gig-economy, 
at least occasionally [2]. While gig-organizations derive 
many operational benefits such as agility and reduced 
costs from their business model, given the size and 
distributed nature of their workforces, they cannot rely 
on the traditional means of supervision to coordinate 
and control work [3]. Instead they rely on algorithmic 
management, a managerial practice whereby human 
managers are replaced by software algorithms that 
oversee, control, and optimize the performance of 
myriads of virtual workers at a large scale [4, 5, 6]. 
In recent years, the societal and managerial 
implications of algorithms have spawned much public 
debate and drawn increasing attention from scholars [4, 
5, 7]. With research into the impacts of algorithms on 
human workers and work practices still in its nascent 
stages, one area of study that remains underexplored is 
the impact of algorithmic management on gig-workers’ 
perceptions of organizational support [4, 8]. Perceived 
organizational support (POS) is the degree to which 
employees believe that their “organization values their 
contributions and cares about their well-being” [9, p. 
698]. Importantly, perceptions of organizational support 
among workers are shown to lead to increased job 
satisfaction, commitment and loyalty, job performance, 
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), as well as 
reduced turnover and employee deviance [9, 10, 11]. 
While the notion of POS may, at first thought, seem 
irrelevant to the gig-work context given that 
independent work is typically defined in part by its lack 
of organizational support [8], and where workers are not 
employees and have no official human supervisor, POS 
has been found to apply in non-traditional work contexts 
akin to gig-work like contract work [12]. Such research 
has not only demonstrated that contingent workers can, 
and do, experience POS, but that they form perceptions 
of support from multiple organizational relationships, 
thereby suggesting the existence of unique antecedents 
for each relational source of POS [12].  
Nevertheless, in spite of such emergent research, 
research exploring POS in non-traditional relationships 
is just beginning. Like many organizational behavior 
theories, POS was developed in traditional management 
contexts where human managers supervise and support 
full-time employees, often by building close, trust-based 
relationships [12]. Unsurprisingly, there is a gap in the 
literature concerning how workers develop POS when 
managed by a “faceless boss” and a set of organizational 
policies enacted through codes [4, 8].  
As the application of new information technologies 
to organizational design continues to change the nature 
of work [3, 13], there is a need to conceptualize new 
POS antecedents for non-traditional work contexts [8, 
10, 12]. Thus, the goal of our paper is to understand how 
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do the impersonal, technology-mediated practices 
inherent of algorithmic management impact workers’ 
perceptions of organizational support, and to explore 
whether the lack of a human supervisor can be 
compensated for by other POS antecedents. As the use 
of algorithmic management reaches beyond the gig-
economy [3, 6, 8, 14, 15], closing this research gap 
stands to offer theoretical and practical contributions to 
the social and managerial study of algorithms – two 
growing and critical areas of research [5, 6, 16].  
Our paper is structured accordingly. We first 
introduce our research context, including boundary 
conditions. Next, we review the POS literature including 
key antecedents, and the importance of POS in the 
context of the gig-economy. We then introduce our 
model and theoretical development. We conclude by 
discussing our research contributions and future work. 
 
2. Algorithmic Management & Gig-Work 
 
The term algorithmic management was initially 
coined by Lee et al. [4] in reference to software 
algorithms and surrounding institutional devices (e.g., 
platforms) that assume managerial functions. 
Considered one of the core innovations enabling the 
platform-based business models of the gig-economy, 
algorithmic management has allowed gig-organizations 
to manage myriads of distributed laborers in an efficient 
(low-cost and real-time) manner [4, 5, 6, 16, 17]. In the 
gig-economy, algorithms are typically responsible for 
matching workers with customers, assigning work, 
monitoring and evaluating work performance, as well as 
implementing a range of HR decisions [4, 6, 18].  
Insofar as algorithmic management is most often 
adopted in freelancing or quasi-employment contexts on 
digital labor platforms [5], we delineate the scope of this 
paper to the study of gig-workers participating on 
platforms that operate as digital marketplaces for 
alternative work where the services exchanged on the 
platform are remunerated, labor-intensive (e.g., Uber) 
rather than capital-intensive (e.g. Airbnb), and can be 
fulfilled either virtually via a crowdsourcing platform 
business model (e.g., MTurk, Upwork) [13, 19] or 
physically via an on-demand platform business model 
(e.g., Uber) [3, 4, 8].  
Within these boundaries, we further recognize that 
intermediary digital labor platforms can be 
conceptualized as a set of technological affordances 
where there is a trade-off between the agency that 
platform features (e.g., algorithms) take in conducting 
transactions and the amount left to participants [13, 18]. 
Using this distinction, digital labor platforms can be 
classified along a continuum ranging from highly 
centralized models (which automate and take control of 
exchanges) to decentralized platforms (which rely on 
the discretion, and thus autonomy, of participants to 
conduct exchanges). Since algorithmic management 
was initially developed to optimize the convenience, 
speed, and seamlessness of undifferentiated, low-skill 
on-demand service exchanges (e.g., Uber) [4, 6, 15], we 
restrict our theory-building to workers participating on 
such highly centralized digital labor platforms. Notably, 
while freelancers marketing higher-skill services on 
“digital platforms with substantial autonomy may not 
expect a [platform-provider] to care about their well-
being”, low-skill workers who are more actively 
managed by a platform firm tend to perceive themselves 
as employees [8, p. 193]. By consequence, perceptions 
of organizational support could have important 
consequences for gig-workers performing low-skill 
work on highly centralized platforms [8].  
Insofar as digital labor marketplaces typically 
involve three parties (clients, gig-workers, and the 
platform provider), the gig-work relationship bears 
conceptual similarities with traditional contract work 
[5]. Given findings that contract workers can form 
perceptions of organizational support from their staffing 
agency, the client organization, or both [12], we 
recognize that gig-workers could form perceptions of 
support from interactions with clients [19]. However, 
considering that the interactions low-skill gig-workers 
have with clients are substantially more fleeting than 
traditional contract workers [5, 8, 12], we limit our focus 
to POS deriving from the platform provider. Notably, 
Kuhn & Maleki [8] suggested that where the nature of a 
platform precludes workers from forming long-term 
relationships with clients, the quality of the relationship 
between the platform firm and gig-worker is likely 
paramount. Thus, focusing on platform-firm induced 
POS is conceptually and contextually important. 
 
3. Perceived Organizational Support 
 
The concept of POS derives from Organizational 
Support Theory (OST) which explains employer-
employee relationships through the lens of social 
exchange theory [9]. Specifically, “OST invokes social 
exchange theory [by conceptualizing employment] as 
the trade of effort and loyalty by the employee for 
tangible benefits and social resources from the 
organization” [10, p. 1857]. Within this frame, OST 
assumes that workers ascertain an organization’s 
readiness to reward their work efforts and to meet their 
socioemotional needs by developing a set of global 
beliefs concerning an organization’s support. 
Perceptions of organizational support allow employees 
to gauge their valuation by the organization which can 
range from a perception that the “organization regards 
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them very positively” to the perception that the 
organization disdains them and wishes “to get rid of 
them given the first opportunity” [20, p. 4].  
According to OST, POS should stimulate the norm 
of reciprocity such that employees treated favorably will 
care about an organization’s well-being and feel an 
obligation to help the organization reach its objectives,  
as well as feel an expectation that their increased 
performance will be recognized and rewarded. As a 
result, both parties benefit: employees experience 
heightened positive mood and job satisfaction, while 
organizations reap the benefits of increased 
commitment, work-effort, and performance [9, 10]. 
 
3.1. Antecedents of POS 
 
In their 2002 meta-analysis of 70 studies, Rhoades 
& Eisenberger [9] identified three major categories of 
POS antecedents, namely: perceived supervisor support 
(PSS); fairness of organizational procedures; and 
organizational rewards and job conditions. More 
recently, the importance of these antecedents was re-
confirmed by Kurtessis et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis of 
558 studies, which subsumed these categories into a set 
of more broadly defined categories of POS antecedents 
[10]. For the sake of parsimony, we focus our theoretical 
development on Rhoades & Eisenberger’s categories. 
This decision is justified by the fact that both PSS and 
fairness have been found to have the largest and most 
significant effects on POS in both meta-analyses. 
We now briefly elaborate these antecedents to 
provide a conceptual understanding of their connections 
to POS and their underlying processes in traditional 
management contexts. Prior to doing so, it is important 
to note that in order to positively impact POS, the 
favorable treatment of workers through these 
antecedents must be perceived as discretionary (e.g., 
under the control of the organization), as opposed to 
compulsory practices imposed by external constraints 
(e.g., government regulations, public pressure, or a tight 
job market) [9, 10, 20]. Specifically, when the favorable 
treatment of workers is considered voluntary on the part 
of the organization, it signals that the motives behind 
such treatment are concerned with employees’ welfare, 
and therefore they positively impact POS [20].  
 
3.1.1. Perceived supervisor support (PSS). In the 
same way that employees develop global beliefs 
concerning their valuation by the organization, they also 
form similar views concerning the degree to which other 
organizational members value their contributions and 
care about their well-being [9]. The favorable treatment 
of employees by organizational members is linked to 
POS because of employees’ tendency to personify the 
organization and to “attribute role-related actions taken 
by members of the organization to the organization 
itself” [10, p. 1861]. Thus, since supervisors act as 
agents of the organization, and have direct ties to upper 
management, employees associate supervisor support 
with organizational support [9]. 
Although both perceived co-worker support and 
team support have been positively related to POS, 
perceived supervisor support (the extent to which 
employees believe that their supervisor values their 
contributions, offers assistance, and cares about their 
well-being) has a significantly stronger effect on POS 
than support from other members [10]. The reason for 
this difference is because supervisors more closely 
embody the organization and are seen as acting on its 
behalf through their responsibility for directing and 
evaluating sub-ordinates’ performance [10]. Moreover, 
supervisors and other organizational leaders play a key 
role in providing rewards and allocating resources to 
employees, and thus are considered to be a greater 
source of organizational support than coworkers [10]. 
 
3.1.2. Fairness of organizational procedures. The 
concept of fairness originates from the Theory of 
Organizational Justice [11]. Procedural justice concerns 
the fairness of the approaches used to determine how 
resources such as pay, promotions, and job assignments 
are distributed. Given that organizational procedures are 
considered by employees to be highly discretionary as 
well as essential to their long-term interests and well-
being, procedural fairness has been found to be one of 
the strongest drivers of POS [9, 10].  
Notably, procedural justice has been conceptualized 
as having both structural and social aspects [9]. 
Specifically, structural aspects are viewed as concerning 
the formal rules and policies pertaining to decisions that 
impact employees, including: “adequate notice before 
decisions are implemented, the receipt of accurate 
information, and voice (i.e., employee input in the 
decision process)” [9, pp. 700-701]. Social aspects are 
viewed as involving the quality of interpersonal 
treatment in the resource allocation process, including: 
“treating employees with dignity and respect, providing 
employees with opportunities for active involvement in 
the development and application of organizational 
procedures, and providing employees with information 
concerning how outcomes are determined” [ibid.].  
Given these two conceptualizations, procedural 
justice can be both a function of an organization, such 
as through a formalized decision-making system, or a 
function of a decision-making agent such as a manager 
that involves an employee in decisions [21]. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the source, repeated episodes 
of intentional fairness in resource distribution are shown 
to have a strong cumulative effect on POS by signaling 
concern for employees’ welfare [9]. 
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3.1.3. Organizational rewards and job conditions. 
Human resource (HR) practices that recognize 
employees’ contributions, as well as various work-role 
characteristics and job conditions, have long-been 
linked to POS. A wide array of HR practices and job 
conditions have been explored in relation to POS, 
including, but not limited to: rewards, benefits, job 
security, autonomy, flexible work-practices, as well as 
training and developmental opportunities [9, 10, 12].  
It is important to note that of the three categories of 
antecedents, organizational rewards and job conditions 
have a weaker impact than PSS and fairness since they 
tend to be attributed to external pressures rather than to 
discretionary behavior [9]. Nevertheless, various HR 
practices, such as rewards and working conditions are 
linked to POS since employees consider such factors to 
be directly tied to the enhancement of their welfare. 
Specifically, by communicating a positive valuation of 
employees’ contributions, favorable opportunities for 
rewards (e.g., recognition, pay, etc.) positively impact 
workers’ perceptions of organizational support [9, 10].  
Similarly, by providing workers with assurance that 
the organization wishes to maintain their future 
membership, both job security as well as training and 
development opportunities are positively linked to POS. 
Conversely, organizational size is negatively related to 
POS; specifically, individuals feel less valued in large 
organizations where formalized policies and procedures 
may reduce flexibility in dealing with employees’ 
individual needs. In terms of effect size, both job 
security and autonomy have been found to have the 
strongest relationships with POS, while training and 
organizational size have been shown to have moderate 
relationships [9, 10].  
 
3.2. POS and the gig-economy 
 
Extensive research, including two meta-analyses 
(e.g., 12, 13), suggests that gig-organizations can 
address two of their key HR management challenges by 
engendering POS among gig-workers. Firstly, gig-
organizations face high turnover rates [3]. Given that 
POS has been related to reduced voluntary turnover and 
turnover intentions [9, 10], gig-organizations that are 
perceived to care about workers’ well-being should be 
better positioned to address the challenges of retaining 
independent workers. In point of fact, in discussing POS 
and PSS, Kuhn & Maleki reported that “workers who 
quit platforms often cite a lack of support” [8, p. 193].  
Secondly, gig-organizations face the challenge of 
managing a large workforce of independent gig-workers 
that are often engaged in client-facing roles, and where 
there is a high risk for opportunistic behavior [3]. As an 
example, in a bid to increase earnings per ride, Uber 
drivers were found to be gaming Uber’s dynamic 
pricing model by simultaneously logging off the app to 
deceptively activate surge pricing [17]. Where POS has 
not only been positively linked to performance, but also 
to organizational identification and organizational 
citizenship behavior, the theory of social exchange 
contends that gig-organizations that are perceived to 
care about workers’ well-being are better positioned to 
manage workers’ performance and to mitigate the risks 
of deviant behavior [9, 10, 11, 12]. 
While the benefits of engendering POS among gig-
workers are clear, traditional paths to POS can be 
disrupted in the context of platform work. For instance, 
job conditions critical to the formation of POS such as 
job security and organizational size are hindered in the 
context of algorithmically-managed platform work. 
Specifically, platform work is characterized by low job-
security [13], a lack of benefits [8], threats to autonomy 
[3, 5, 6], as well as a large and boundless organizational 
size [4, 5], all of which can harm POS.  
The use of algorithmic management is also expected 
to disrupt the POS antecedents of supervisor support and 
procedural fairness. Insofar as algorithmic management 
systems necessitate the minimization of human 
intervention to benefit from algorithmic-efficiencies, 
algorithmic management marks a radical departure from 
earlier managerial logic, which relied heavily on human 
supervisors to direct work [5, 6, 15]. In algorithmically 
managed contexts, most managerial and decision-
making processes are reduced into a set of opaque 
algorithmic processes that are both complex and 
inaccessible to the typical worker [1, 6, 8]. Thus, given 
the scarcity of human intervention and considering that 
workers’ subjective interpretations of procedural justice 
play a key role in forming perceptions of organizational 
support, both antecedents of supervisor support and 
procedural justice will be disrupted by algorithmic 
management [8]. As such, a new theory of POS is 
required for algorithmically-managed gig-work. 
 
4. Theoretical Development 
 
We now develop our conceptual model exploring the 
impact of algorithmic management on POS. To do so, 
we rely on Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s [5] 
conceptualization of algorithmic management which 
defines the concept across five dimensions: (1) the 
constant tracking of workers’ behavior; (2) constant 
performance evaluation; (3) the automatic 
implementation of decisions; (4) workers’ interaction 
with a “system”; and (5) (low) transparency. We adopt 
Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s conceptualization as it is the 
first detailed, IS-specific research perspective of the 
phenomenon. Notably, their model is aligned with Lee 
et al.’s [4] pioneering exploration of the phenomenon, 
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and recent high-level definitions of algorithmic 
management and its key features (e.g., [15, 22]).  
The foundation of our model (Figure 1) hinges on the 
role that a gig-organization’s algorithm plays in 
engendering POS by promoting perceptions of fairness 
and perceptions of autonomy support. Our theoretical 
development is structured as follows. First, we propose 
the perception of algorithms as ‘social agents’ and 
introduce two algorithmic perceptions as antecedents of 
POS. After, we explore these two antecedents in depth 
to understand how they are impacted by Möhlmann & 
Zalmanson’s dimensions of algorithmic management.  
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
4.1. Algorithms as Social Agents 
 
Insofar as gig-workers lack an official human 
supervisor and are often managed through customer 
service representatives over email correspondences or 
chatbots [5, 10], PSS is likely to be low [10]. Yet when 
supervisors are replaced by algorithms, we suggest that 
key POS antecedents are embodied within the algorithm 
itself such that it will be considered as more than just a 
tool or set of rules, but also as a social actor – an 
algorithmic ‘manager’ per se. To understand this 
conceptualization, we defer to a key predecessor of the 
contemporary literature on algorithmic perceptions.  
Dating back nearly 20 years, scholars in the fields of 
human-computer-interaction (HCI) and social factors, 
studied how people perceive computers [14]. Within 
this stream of work, the Computers Are Social Actors 
(CASA) paradigm originated with the publication of 
Nass & Moon’s [23] article which demonstrated that 
people respond to computers according to “socio-
psychological principles similar to those that regulate 
human-to-human interaction” [14, p. 3]. Drawing on the 
human personality psychology literature, Nass & Moon 
argued that the tendency for individuals to interact with 
computers as if they were social agents, and not just 
tools, was due to individuals mindlessly applying social 
rules and expectations to computers [23].  
Mindless behavior is the result of conscious attention 
to a subset of contextual cues, where such “cues trigger 
various scripts, labels, and expectations, [that] in turn 
focus attention on certain information while diverting 
attention away from other information” [23, p. 83]. 
Thus, to elicit mindless social responses in a computer-
human context, a person must be presented with an 
object that has sufficient humanlike cues to lead the 
person to categorize it as worthy of social responses 
while ignoring the asocial nature of the computer [23]. 
Nass & Moon suggested three cues that might 
encourage the categorization of computers as social 
actors, namely: (1) words for output; (2) interactivity or 
responses based on multiple prior inputs; and (3) the 
filling of roles traditionally filled by humans.  
Arguably, all of these cues are present in the context 
of algorithmic management where software algorithms 
operating on platforms assume managerial functions, 
and gig-workers remain connected to the digital labor 
platform through a digital device. Specifically, by virtue 
of definition, managerial algorithms fill roles 
traditionally assigned to humans. Moreover, the 
algorithms powering the platforms, which serve as the 
interface between the gig-worker and algorithm, use 
words for output, and exhibit high interactivity and 
responses based on personalized information which is 
supplied and gathered via the digital device that 
connects a worker to the platform [4, 5, 15]. Thus, we 
argue that the algorithms operating on digital labor 
platforms provide sufficient bases for workers to cue 
“humanness,” and to encourage social responses via the 
treatment of computers as social actors.  
 
4.1.1. Perceived Algorithmic Fairness. Perceptions of 
organizational support are driven by employees’ 
tendencies to assign humanlike characteristics to 
organizations and to attribute the actions taken by its 
agents (e.g., managers) as indications of the 
organization’s intent towards them. This process of 
personification is supported by “the organization’s 
legal, moral, and financial responsibility for the actions 
of its agents; by organizational policies, norms, and 
culture that provide continuity and prescribe role 
behaviors; and by the power the organization’s agents 
exert over individual employees” [9, p. 698].  
Considering that algorithms implemented in 
management contexts operate on, and enact, a set of 
previously developed rules and instructions that embody 
an organization’s policies and procedures, we suggest 
that managerial algorithms can be considered both as 
embodiments of procedural justice, and as 
organizational agents demonstrating fairness (or 
unfairness) in their decision-making processes. This 
proposition is supported by the CASA literature [23], 
and the notion that procedural justice can be a function 
of an organization, such as its formal decision-making 
system, or a function of a decision-making agent [21].  
Importantly, recent work suggests that individuals 
do attribute managerial algorithms to the organizations 
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that chose them [14]. This is aligned with the fact that 
as an intermediary between workers and clients, the 
platform owner  is the only party with full access to and 
control over the platform’s data, processes, and rules 
[3]. As such, a gig-organization’s algorithm(s) “can be 
understood as an automated manifestation of the 
interests of the platform organizer” [6, p. 9]. We 
therefore introduce the concept of Perceived 
Algorithmic Fairness (PAF) which we define as a 
platform-worker’s perception concerning the fairness of 
the algorithmic approaches applied by a digital labor 
platform to determine how resources are distributed. 
Thus, we propose:  
 
P1: Perceived algorithmic fairness will be positively 
related to POS. 
 
4.1.2. Perceived Algorithmic Autonomy Support. 
While many job conditions critical to the formation of 
POS are hindered in algorithmically-managed contexts 
we propose that job autonomy will remain a key 
determinant of POS for platform workers. Specifically, 
the need for autonomy has been cited extensively by 
independent gig-workers as a leading driver for 
participation in the gig-economy [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 13].  
Generally speaking, autonomy refers to an 
individual’s inherent desire to experience a sense of 
choice, volition, and psychological freedom when 
engaging in an activity [3], while job autonomy refers to 
the freedom an individual has in carrying out their work 
including planning, decision-making, and choosing 
when and how to perform the task [9, 13]. Within the 
motivation literature, autonomy is considered a basic 
need among individuals such that its satisfaction 
promotes worker well-being [24]. Similarly, within the 
job-design literature, autonomy has been emphasized as 
an important aspect of job-design that makes jobs more 
satisfying, thereby promoting employee well-being [3]. 
Importantly, both the technical aspects of one’s work 
(e.g., job-design) as well as the general social context in 
which the work is done can (e.g., managers’ treatment 
of employees) can promote workers’ autonomy [3, 24]. 
In the context of the gig-economy, algorithms 
typically assume control and responsibility for matching 
of workers with customers, assigning work, and 
evaluating workers’ performance [4, 6, 15]. In this 
frame, a gig-worker’s autonomy is defined in terms of 
their ability to self-schedule when they work, their right 
to reject or accept gigs and, depending on the platform, 
their ability to choose the methods and processes they 
use to conduct their work [1, 3, 6, 8]. Importantly, recent 
research has proposed that the operational choices 
embedded within a platform’s architecture will 
implicitly shape a platform workers’ autonomy such that 
platforms can be conceptualized and defined as either 
autonomy supportive or non-supportive [3, 8]. We thus 
introduce the concept of perceived algorithmic 
autonomy support (PAAS), which we define as the 
degree to which a platform-worker perceives that an 
algorithmically-managed digital labor platform is 
autonomy supportive. 
Notably, the promise of freedom and autonomy (e.g., 
be your own boss) is a well-recognized cornerstone of 
the gig-economy’s recruitment tactics. In this respect, 
platforms that fail to support workers’ autonomy may 
represent a breach in psychological contract [12]. The 
concept of “psychological contract reflects employees’ 
beliefs about their social exchange relationships with 
their organization, mutual obligations, and the extent to 
which the obligations are fulfilled” [10, p. 10]. Per 
Kurtessis et al. [10], obligations can be based on explicit 
organizational promises or implicit expectations held by 
employees. Since organizational promises are most 
often viewed as voluntary, contract breach has a strong 
negative relationship with POS [10]. Thus, platforms 
that thwart workers’ autonomy should be negatively 
related to POS. Conversely, by demonstrating the 
organization’s trust in workers’ judgment and skills to 
decide wisely how to do their job, platforms that support 
workers’ autonomy should strengthen POS [9, 10]. 
Moreover, in doing so, platforms that support workers’ 
autonomy also demonstrate organizational concern for 
workers’ well-being [3, 24] and fulfillment of the 
psychological contract [10]. Thus, we propose that: 
 
P2: Perceived algorithmic autonomy support will be 
positively related to POS. 
 
4.2. Perceived Algorithmic Autonomy Support 
 
Given that companies that promote workers’ 
autonomy through the right to self-schedule and the 
right to accept or decline work-orders tend to experience 
reduced profit margins, as well as coverage issues 
leading to client dissatisfaction, gig-organizations are 
known to counter workers’ autonomy through “softer” 
and less visible forms of control [1]. A well-recognized 
phenomenon of the gig-economy, the concept of ‘soft 
control’ [17] is enabled by three features of algorithmic 
management: constant tracking; constant evaluation, 
and low transparency or high opacity [1, 5, 17, 18]. 
 
4.2.1. Constant tracking and evaluation. Algorithmic 
management is characterized by the constant tracking of 
individual workers’ behaviors through a digital device 
that connects the worker to the platform [4, 5]. Such 
tracking can take various forms ranging from the 
tracking of Uber drivers’ locations and driving patterns 
(e.g., acceleration and breaking) to platform-based 
surveillance software such as Work Diary used by 
Upwork to track workers’ keystrokes and take 
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screenshots of their work [3, 5, 8]. In turn, the tracked 
data is used to evaluate workers’ performance [4, 5, 17] 
whereby an algorithm will automatically reward or 
punish workers for achieving or failing to maintain 
benchmark levels of key performance indicators [1, 3, 
4, 5]. Through algorithmic tracking and evaluations, 
workers’ autonomy can be significantly curtailed; 
specifically, both the surveillance of workers as well as 
evaluations (accompanied by rewards or punishments) 
have been shown to threaten perceptions of autonomy 
and to foster feelings of control by impeding workers’ 
freedom to govern and control their behavior [3, 1, 6, 8]. 
Thus, we propose that:  
 
P3: The constant tracking of gig-workers’ behaviors 
(P3a) and the constant evaluation of their performance 
(P3b) will be negatively related to perceived 
algorithmic autonomy support.  
 
4.2.2. Algorithmic transparency. The term 
‘algorithmic transparency’ was coined by Diakopoulos 
& Koliska [25] in reference to the disclosure of the 
factors that influence the decisions made by algorithms 
to ensure the monitoring, checking, criticism, and/or 
intervention by those who use, regulate, and are 
impacted by such algorithms. Per Möhlmann & 
Zalmanson [5], algorithmic management is 
characterized by low levels of transparency, a situation 
known as algorithmic opacity [25, 26]. Understandably, 
algorithmic opacity is often a strategic decision taken by 
the platform owner to avoid disclosing proprietary 
information and to deter workers from ‘gaming the 
system’ [4, 5, 6, 26]. Most often, it is leveraged by 
platform owners to intentionally generate information 
asymmetries aimed at controlling workers’ decision-
making autonomy [1, 6, 17, 25, 26]. 
When algorithms lack transparency, the decisions 
generated by an algorithm can seem “impenetrable, 
erratic, and unpredictable” [6, p. 2] leaving workers 
frustrated with the opacity of the decision-making 
system, and leading to reductions in workers’ autonomy 
[3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 27]. For instance, Shapiro [1] found 
that updates to the worker-facing application that 
limited the information an algorithm provided the 
worker, as well as unannounced changes to the 
algorithms’ payment system, substantially curtailed 
workers’ decision-making capacities with respect to 
which jobs to accept or decline. Conversely, when 
algorithms are transparent, workers are able to gain a 
basic familiarity with the platform’s functions [6] and, 
by extension, regain their sense of autonomy through 
their ability to navigate and control various aspects of 
their work, and to take informed decisions [4, 5, 6].  
Notably, transparency is also viewed as a way to 
discern the truth and motives behind people’s actions [6, 
25]. Given that algorithmic transparency bolsters 
workers’ decision-making capacities, it is likely to be 
perceived by workers as an indication of the 
organization’s trust in their abilities to decide wisely 
how to do their job, and thereby a support of their 
autonomy. Thus, we propose that: 
 
P4: Algorithmic transparency will be positively related 
to perceived algorithmic autonomy support. 
 
4.3. Perceived Algorithmic Fairness 
 
Digital labor platforms rely heavily on minimizing 
human intervention to ensure flexibility, agility, and 
efficiency through a process of scaling and automation 
[5, 6, 14, 18]. As a result, algorithmic working 
environments are characterized by the automatic 
implementation of decisions where “algorithms do 
things” and feelings of working with a “system” rather 
than humans [5, 16, 17]. Justifiably, the impacts of 
algorithms as both decision-makers and enactors on 
workers’ perceptions of fairness are significant, 
particularly in the characteristically low transparency 
context of algorithmic management [5, 14].  
 
4.3.1. Algorithmic transparency. Generally speaking, 
procedural fairness is determined by whether the 
decision-making process is: based on accurate 
information; objective; transparent; consistently 
applied; and includes safeguards, such as an appeal 
process to correct flawed or inaccurate decisions [8, 9, 
10, 21]. Given that algorithmic decision-makers lack 
both agency and emotion and, by definition, follow the 
same set of procedures every time, it has been suggested 
that algorithms have the potential to reduce bias and 
increase consistency in managerial processes such as 
decision-making [5, 8, 14]. Yet, it has also been found 
that the choices and decisions made by algorithms 
cannot be considered entirely free of bias [25] given that 
they “reflect both the conscious and subconscious 
assumptions and ideas of their creators” [16, p. 19].  
Given these conflicting findings and considering that 
judging the bias of an organization’s algorithm would 
be beyond the scope of this paper, we focus our 
theorizing on algorithmic transparency. Specifically, the 
organizational justice literature contends that providing 
employees with information concerning how outcomes 
are determined is key to engendering perceptions of 
procedural fairness and trustworthiness. Moreover, the 
provision of such information also allows workers to 
ascertain whether the decision-making process 
represents the concerns of the groups impacted, another 
criterion used to ascertain procedural fairness [9, 10, 21, 
25]. Thus, we propose that: 
 
P5: Algorithmic transparency will be positively related 
to perceptions of algorithmic fairness.  
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Notably, algorithmic transparency can also enable 
workers to form perceptions concerning other aspects of 
procedural fairness, including the presence of bias and 
the consistency of decisions over people and time, 
where the latter is particularly hard to discern given that 
algorithms also change over time as they learn [5, 26].  
 
4.3.2. Automatic decision-making. Within algorithmic 
management systems, algorithms form and 
automatically execute a range of managerial decisions 
[4, 5]. While automatic decision-making processes 
promote operational efficiency [5], they may also have 
detrimental impacts on perceptions of fairness. As 
mentioned earlier, perceptions of procedural fairness are 
enhanced when decision-makers involve workers in 
decisions and provide them with adequate notice before 
such decisions are made. Considering that algorithmic 
decision-making processes are formed and executed 
automatically with minimal human intervention [4, 5], 
organizational justice theory suggests that automatic 
decision-making is expected to be negatively related to 
perceived algorithmic fairness [21]. Nevertheless, given 
that organizational justice theory was initially 
conceptualized for traditional work contexts where 
humans take and implement managerial decisions, to 
fully understand the impact of automatic decision-
making on perceptions of procedural fairness, we must 
look to emerging work exploring the perceived fairness 
of algorithmic decision-makers.  
In a recent experiment comparing algorithmic and 
human decision-makers across different decisions, Lee 
[14] found that people’s perceptions of fairness were 
impacted by decision-type. Specifically, Lee identified 
two managerial decision-types: those requiring 
mechanical skills (e.g., work assignment and work 
scheduling) and those requiring human skills (e.g., 
hiring and work evaluation). In comparing participants’ 
reactions across decision-makers and decision-types, 
Lee [14] found that when algorithms allocated work (a 
task requiring mechanical skills), such decisions were 
perceived as equally fair to human-made decisions. In 
this case, participants attributed the fairness of 
algorithmic decisions to their perceived efficiency and 
objectivity. Conversely, when algorithms evaluated 
workers (a task requiring human skills), people tended 
to view such decisions as less fair than human-made 
decisions due to perceptions that algorithms lack 
“intuition, only measure quantifiable metrics, and 
cannot evaluate social interaction or handle exceptions” 
[p. 12].  
Thus, in contexts where automatic decision-making 
“leaves no time to discuss or revise decisions arising 
from special circumstances not wholly captured by the 
data” [5, p. 5], and where people perceive algorithms as 
efficient, but incapable of considering the nuances of 
human behavior as well as other non-quantifiable 
variables, we propose that: 
 
P6: The relationship between automatic decision-
making and perceived algorithmic fairness will be 
moderated by decision-type, such that automatic 
decision-making will have a negative impact on 
perceived algorithmic fairness for work evaluation 
decisions (P6a) and a positive impact for work 
allocation decisions (P6b).  
 
4.3.3. Interacting with a “system”. Another key 
determinant of procedural justice is the inclusion of 
mechanisms, or safeguards, to correct flawed or 
inaccurate decisions. Also, from a social perspective, 
providing employees with a ‘voice’ (e.g., allowing for 
input in the decision-making process) as well as 
providing information concerning how outcomes are 
determined have both been found to cultivate a strong 
sense that one’s organization values one’s contribution 
and cares about one’s well-being [9, 10, 21].  
Per Möhlmann & Zalmanson [5], a defining 
characteristic of algorithmic work environments is the 
lack of human and social relationships. In particular, 
gig-workers lack both an official human supervisor as 
well as access to co-workers [3, 4, 5, 6, 8]. Although 
gig-workers across various platforms (e.g., MTurk, 
Uber, TaskRabbit) have created independent online 
forums to support each other and to voice their opinions 
[3, 4, 6, 8], the social interactions afforded by these 
forums would have limited impact on perceptions of the 
social aspects of procedural justice. Specifically, 
although online forums provide a space for sensemaking 
activities around algorithmic management [1, 4, 5] that 
may help workers to understand and thereby ascertain 
whether a platform’s decision-making algorithm is 
objective, lacks bias, and/or is consistently applied, 
these forums are neither supported nor promoted by 
platform owners [3]. As such, any information provided 
through such forums (and sensemaking activities, [6]) 
concerning algorithmic decisions is unlikely to be 
attributed to the organization, or its concern for workers’ 
well-being [8]. Moreover, given that such virtual 
communities are independently run, they provide no 
avenues for workers to have a voice in organizational 
decision-making, nor do they offer organizationally-
endorsed safeguards for appealing decisions.  
Considering that algorithmic management allows a 
few human managers to oversee thousands of workers, 
by definition, gig-workers tend to have limited avenues 
to discuss issues with human supervisors [4, 5]. 
Specifically, given the lack of open, two-sided 
communication, algorithmic management does not 
allow for the questioning and discussing of algorithmic 
decision-making processes and outcomes [5]. 
Moreover, even when workers attempt to reach 
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customer service agents or managers, they are often 
referred to chatbots or email correspondence mediated 
via the platform [8, 17]. As a result, workers tend to 
perceive that they are working for an abstract “system”, 
rather than an organization composed of people [5]. 
Thus, we propose that: 
 
P7: Perceptions of interacting with a “system” will be 
negatively related to perceived algorithmic fairness. 
 
5. Scholarly and Practical Contributions  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among 
the first in IS to explore the impact of algorithmic 
management on POS. From a scholarly standpoint, it 
answers calls for technology-focused research on the 
growing platform economy. According to a recent 
review, though 91% of the papers surveyed consider 
technology to be a critical element of the platform-
economy, most studies tend to ignore or black-box the 
conceptualization of technology [18]. By adopting 
Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s [5] IS-based conceptual 
framework to explore how the five dimensions of 
algorithmic management impact POS, we begin to 
unpack the role of technology in this research stream 
[18]. Importantly, our focus on algorithmic perceptions 
(e.g., PAAS and PAF) is aligned with a growing stream 
of work exploring how people perceive algorithms and 
the mental models they form concerning how algorithms 
operate, despite how they actually work [14].  
By exploring the phenomenon of POS within the 
context of the algorithmic management and the gig-
economy, we answer calls for research exploring the 
impacts of contextual variables on POS [10], and the 
impact of algorithmic management on perceptions of 
justice and organizational support [8, 14]. Building on 
the CASA paradigm, we suggest that, in the absence of 
human interaction with organizational members (e.g., 
supervisors and peers), an organization’s algorithm is 
likely to be viewed by gig-workers as both a social agent 
of the organization and a manifestation of the 
organization itself. Importantly, this proposition leads to 
several implications for the development of POS which 
can be empirically tested in the context of 
algorithmically-managed platform work. Notably, a key 
benefit of organizational support theory for the study of 
algorithmic management is that it is a relatively mature 
stream of research with well-established instruments 
that are readily available for empirical testing [9]. 
Given that gig-organizations are still experimenting 
with the technical designs and algorithms governing 
their platforms, scholars from the fields of IS and 
management have turned their attention to the design of 
platforms in an effort to improve both the treatment of 
workers and their satisfaction [3, 5, 6, 19]. From a 
practical standpoint, our paper highlights the possibility 
for gig-organizations to gain strategic advantage by 
engendering POS through the design of their platforms 
to address the universal challenges of retention and 
supervision in the gig-economy. In doing so, our paper 
echoes concern for the need for increased transparency 
in platform algorithms and the importance of the 
‘human element’ with respect to decisions pertaining to 
evaluation and the provision of support [1, 5, 8, 14].  
Understanding that algorithmic opacity is often an 
intentional strategy to protect ‘trade secrets’ tied to 
shareholder value, our theoretical development stresses 
that organizations must pay careful consideration to 
what aspects of the decision-making process should be 
transparent vs. opaque. More specifically, platform 
owners should bolster algorithmic transparency where 
doing so supports workers’ autonomy. Though platform 
owners may worry that increasing transparency will 
enable workers to ‘game the system’, research shows 
that when faced with algorithmic opacity, workers tend 
to engage in sensemaking to circumvent algorithms that 
curtail their autonomy [1, 4, 6, 8]. In such cases, workers 
are more prone to harbor negative feelings towards the 
organization and to game the system in retaliation [4].  
At a high-level, increasing algorithmic transparency 
could involve explaining to platform workers the goals 
and intent of a managerial algorithm, as well as 
articulating the “rationale for the selection, inclusion, 
exclusion, or optimization of various inputs or outputs 
to the algorithm” [25, p. 817]. Where disclosing 
algorithms is not possible, organizations may seek to 
elicit feelings of procedural fairness by submitting 
themselves to routine algorithmic audits carried out by 
a third-party which can provide indications that 
algorithms are objective, accurate, and consistent [26]. 
 
6. Limitations & Future Research 
 
Given the developmental nature of our paper, two 
limitations in our work present opportunities for future 
research. Firstly, we did not consider the impact of 
workers’ personality on POS and its algorithmic 
antecedents. For instance, individuals’ dispositional 
tendencies to experience positive or negative affect can 
“influence POS by altering whether employees interpret 
organizational treatment as benevolent or malevolent” 
[9, p. 701]. Secondly, we did not consider differing 
extents of algorithmic management, which can impact a 
worker’s agency and autonomy [18]. These limitations 
present valuable future research opportunities.  
The next step in our research is to empirically test 
our theory. Due to the complexity of our model and the 
lack of existing instrumentation for the concept of 
algorithmic management (and its sub-dimensions), we 
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will begin by testing P1 and P2. An online survey study 
has been designed to collect data from a sample of 200 
Uber drivers (an extreme case of algorithmic 
management) [5]. Undertaking our survey will require 
developing an instrument for our newly proposed PAAS 
construct. To do so, we will conduct interviews with 
Uber drivers, followed by content-validation with 
experts. We hope that the next stages of our research 
will provide both methodological and theoretical 
contributions to the study of algorithms and POS. 
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